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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DESERET COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation,
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
JSJ CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation,

Case No. 16992

Defendant-Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves the sale of certain industrial machinery to
plaintiff by defendant.

The machinery has never functioned pro-

perly, and plaintiff brought suit charging breach of express and
implied warranties.

Plaintiff seeks a return of the money paid for

the defective machine, and seeks to have defendant remove the
machine from plaintiff's premises.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On February 19, 1980, the trial court granted defendant's
motion to quash service of process for lack of personal jurisdiction
over defendant.

That order was modified on March 5, 1980, by agree-

ment of the parties.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the trial court's granting of a
motion to quash service of process on defendant, and seeks to have
the matter remanded for a trial on the merits.
-1-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation authorized to do business
and doing business in Utah.

Defendant is a Delaware corporation

with its principal place of business in Michigan.
In 1975, representatives of plaintiff, in response to magazine
advertising placed by defendant, contacted defendant at its Grand
Haven, Michigan, headquarters to inquire about purchasing a certain
large, custom-made packaging machine.
manager, Lee

Defendant sent its general

s. Kihnke, to plaintiff's plant in Sandy, Salt Lake

County, Utah to pursue the discussion, Affidavit of James C. Loveless, Record on Appeal at 38.

The visit was followed by corres-

pondence and telephone calls consisting of the submissions of
proposals, quotations of prices, revisions of specifications, etc.
Eventually, those negotiations ripened, and on November 29,
1977, Mr. Kihnke mailed a revised proposal to plaintiff's Sandy
office, id.

Included was a document called the "Dake Installation

Policy," Record at 46, in which defendant agreed to provide "factory
trained technicians" to supervise installation of the machine at the
Sandy plant.
On February 17, 1978, plaintiff accepted the offer by mailing
a check for $22,861.25 to defendant as a down payment on the machine,
the total purchase price of which was $91,445, Loveless affidavit,
Record at 39.

Defendant acknowledged receipt of the order, and

proposed a July delivery date, Record at 57.

Plaintiff sent a truck

to Michigan to pick up the machine, and on August 28, 1978, defendant's "factory-trained specialist," Robert Wydeck, arrived in Utah
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to supervise the installation, Loveless affidavit, Record at 39.
Since that time, however, the machine has never worked properly.

In

November of 1978, two of the defendant's employees came to Utah, and
spent several days trying to repair the machine, but without success, id. at 40.

Therefore, plaintiff sought a refund of payments

made for the machine, and also sought its removal.

When the parties

were unable to agree on a remedy, this lawsuit was filed.
ARGUMENT
I.

JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT WAS PROPER UNDER UTAH
LAW AS IT EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE RULING BELOW.
A.

THIS COURT HAS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
DEFENDANT BECAUSE IT CONTRACTED TO PROVIDE
SERVICES IN THE STATE OF UTAH.

Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24, provides
in pertinent part:
Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or
resident of this state, who in person or through
an agent does any of the following enumerated
acts, submits himself . . . to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state as to any claim arising
from:
(1)

(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in
this state;
Defendant's action falls within this provision of the long-arm
statute, and defendant is subject to the in personam jurisdiction
of this court because it contracted to provide a "factory trained
service technician" to supervise the installation of the machine
in Utah which plaintiff purchased from defendant.

The installa-

tion was clearly a service, and the contract to provide such a
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service in Utah places defendant squarely within the ambit of the
long-arm statute.
B.

THIS COURT HAS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
DEFENDANT BECAUSE IT TRANSACTED BUSINESS IN
THIS STATE AND CAUSED INJURY WITHIN THE STATE
BY BREACH OF WARRANTY.

Utah's long-arm statute also provides that a non-resident
submits himself to the jurisdiction of Utah's courts by the
transaction of any business within this state, or by the causing
of any injury within this state by breach of warranty.

Utah Code

Ann. §78-27-24.
The words "transaction of business within this state" are
defined in Utah Code Ann. §78-27-23 as:
Activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or
representatives in this state which affect persons
or businesses within the State of Utah.
Under this definition, there is little question that defendant
transacted business in the State of Utah by coming here to solicit
plaintiff's business, by communicating with plaintiff by telephone
and through the mails, by selling plaintiff a machine worth some
$90,000 knowing that it would be used in Utah, and by sending its
employees and representatives here to install, service and attempt to
repair the machine.

Nothing could more directly "affect persons or

businesses" within Utah than the malfunctioning of a piece of machinery essential to a Utah business.
Defendant is also subject to the jurisdiction of this court
because plaintiff has properly alleged that defendant caused injury
by breach of both implied-in-law warranties and the express warranty
contained in the contract.
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There can be no doubt that Utah's long-arm statute purports to
reach the defendant in this case on all three grounds discussed.

The

question then is whether subjecting this defendant to suit in Utah is
consistent with due process, which is satisfied so long as the exercise of jurisdiction "does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice," International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945).

C.

DUE PROCESS IS NOT OFFENDED BY SUBJECTING
THIS DEFENDANT TO TRIAL IN UTAH.

To establish the purpose of the long-arm statute, the legislature codified the following language:
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public interest demands the
state provide its citizens with an effective means
of redress against nonresident persons, who
through certain significant minimal contacts with
this state, incur obligations to citizens entitled
to the state's protection. This legislative
action is deemed necessary because of technological progress which has substantially increased the
flow of commerce between the several states resulting in increased interaction between persons of
this state and persons of other states.
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-22 (emphasis added).

The preamble to the

long-arm statute continues:
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum
protection to citizens of this state, should be
applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-22.

In addressing the application of those

provisions, Justice Crockett stated:
We consider it our responsibility to give effect
to that objective by extending the jurisdiction of
our courts as far as the limitations of fairness

-5-
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and established law will permit. . . . It is
suggested, and there seems to be validity to the
idea, that when the activity or conduct out of
which the claimed liability arose occurs in the
forum state, for example, where the contract was
executed, or is to be performed, in whole or in
part, or where an alleged tort occurred, courts
are generally more disposed to apply the "minimal
contacts" test and to find jurisdiction.
Producers Livestock Loan Co. v. Miller, 580 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah
1978) (emphasis added).

Justice Crockett added that in order to

assert jurisdiction over a party, the defendant must be engaged
in substantial activities beyond mere transitory matters
so that it is reasonable and just to assume that
he has had the benefit of the protections and
advantages of the laws and institutions of the
state to the extent that it is within the concept
of fairness and due process that he be subjected
to the jurisdiction of its courts.
Id.

He gave three examples of transitory matters which help

defin~

the limitations imposed on long-arm jurisdiction by con-

siderations of due process:
where a person buys stock in a corporation, .such
as U.S. Steel or General Motors, where the enterprise is located in and carried on in another
state; or where a manufacturer advertises and
distributes his products for sale through independent dealers or retailers in other states; or
where persons who are merely traveling through or
vacationing in other states engage in single and
transitory transactions for the purpose of normal
subsistence and activities. (emphasis added).
Id.

That guidance is instructive and shows that this court's

jurisdiction over the defendant in this case does not violate
notions of due process.

In each of the examples given, the

unfairness of exercising jurisdiction is obvious.

A huge public

corporation cannot reasonably restrict the sale of its stock only
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to citizens of certain states -- that would violate the "privileges and immunities" clause of the United States Constitution,
Art. IV

§

2.

Nor can it possibly foresee where it might be sub-

ject to suit if it could be haled into any forum where an aggrieved stockholder happened to be domiciled.

Justice Crockett's

distinction has since been recognized by the United States Supreme Court, which stated that a pivotal element in the due process inquiry is whether
the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum State are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into Court there.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567 (1980).
Similarly, it would be unfair to predicate jurisdiction on
the acts of an independent, autonomous distributor over whom a
defendant could exercise no control.

Finally, subjecting a

traveler to the exercise of jurisdiction in any state where he
made a small, isolated transaction would leave the traveler at
the mercy of unscrupulous merchants who could file bad-faith
actions, secure in the knowledge that the small amounts involved
would probably force a default.

Such a situation would, as a

practical matter, so discourage travel as to intolerably burden
interstate commerce.
In this action, defendant contracted to perform the contract
at issue, at least in part, by coming to Utah and installing and
servicing the machine in question.

The forum-state activity was

more than foreseeable, it was inevitable.

There was no place

other than Utah that the installed machine could be used, or

-7- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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where its failure could cause injury.

And it is clear that

defendant's activity was not transitory but rather substantial.
Unlike Justice Crockett's example of an insubstantial contact by
a manufacturer who acts only through an independent dealer or
retailer in the forum state, defendant here did not have an
independent dealer or retailer in Utah through which it dealt
with plaintiff, but rather it dealt with plaintiff directly.

Its

officers and employees came to Utah on numerous occasions and
they also communicated directly with plaintiff by telephone and
through the mail.

Nor was defendant "merely traveling" through

the state for the purpose of engaging "in single and transitory
transactions for the purpose of normal subsistence and activities."

Clearly, defendant's actions went beyond Justice Crock-

ett's examples of_ insubstantial activity and by so acting defendant has subjected itself to the jurisdiction of this court.
Justice Crockett's opinion in Producers Livestock followed
by a month an opinion on in personam jurisdiction by Justice
Wilkins, Abbott GM Diesel, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 578 P.2d
850 (1978).

Justice Crockett's opinion amplified the criteria

identified by Justice Wilkins in addressing the due process
aspects of personal jurisdiction.

Justice Wilkins stated that in

order to "infuse full vitality into the mandate by our Legislature to apply the long-arm statute to the fullest extent permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment," 578 P.2d at 854, an inquiry
should be made of:
1.

The nature and quality of the defendant's acts;
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2.

Whether defendant is engaged in purposeful,
rather than unintentional, acts in order to avail
itself of the privileges and protections in Utah;
and

3.

Any other relevant matters.

The first and third elements are fairly general and somewhat undefined.

Presumably, Justice Crockett's discussion in Producers

Livestock is an expansion on these elements, and as we have
argued, the defendant J.S.J. Corporation in this action falls
within these elements for due process purposes.

In addition,

this defendant also clearly satisfies the second element identified by Justice Wilkins, since the acts in question were purposeful.
The question is not whether defendant's advertising alone
was a sufficiently purposeful act to justify haling it into
court.

The point here is that the sale of a custom-made machine

for installation and use exclusively in Utah is without a doubt
sufficiently purposeful.

Had defendant wished to avoid Utah

jurisdiction, it could have declined to send plaintiff the offer
to sell.

But defendant ought not complain when a forum which it

found to be a fair and convenient place to transact a substantial
piece of business asks it to appear and defend an action involving that same large and expensive machine.

Defendant had a

choice, and by consenting to transact business in this forum it
thereby submitted itself to jurisdiction of its courts.

The

motion to dismiss should have been denied.

-9-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

II.

CONTROLLING UTAH CASE LAW, ANNOUNCED SINCE THE RULING
BELOW, REQUIRES THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION OVER
DEFENDANTS AND A REMAND OF THIS CASE FOR TRIAL ON THE
MERITS.

.-·"

The defendant's motion to quash was granted on February 19,
1980, and amended by stipulation of the parties on March 5.

On Marc

4 and March 6 of 1980, this Court handed down two decisions that

...,·:

dramatically and unmistakably mandated an expansive interpretation o
the long-arm statute.

Even if plaintiff concedes, arguendo and

contrary to the fact, that the trial court's decision in this case
correctly reflected then-prevalent Utah law, it is apparent that the
subsequent decisions require a contrary result, since the facts of
this case fall squarely within the ambit of those cases.*
In the first of those cases, Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill,
608 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980), the facts were strikingly similar to the
present case.

There, a Utah firm initiated contact with a Californic

manufacturer of drilling equipment.

The defendant delivered the

equipment to Denver, Colorado, from where the plaintiff took it to a
job site in New Mexico.

When the equipment began malfunctioning,

*

The fact that the trial court's decision was rendered prior to
these cases does not, of course, prevent this Court from applying the
new law to this appeal.
It is the general rule that when there is a change
of law by judicial decision between the time of
trial and the time of appeal the appellate court
will dispose of the case according to the law
prevailing at the time of the appellate disposition
and not according to the law prevailing at the time
of rendition of the judgment appealed.
Arnold v. Knettle, 10 Ariz. App. 509, 460 P.2d 45, 47 (1969).

-10-
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the defendant sent repair crews to the New Mexico site.

Subse-

quently, plaintiff, for the first time, transported the machine
into Utah, where it again malfunctioned on a job despite further
repair efforts by one of the defendant's employees.

In the

ensuing litigation, jurisdiction over the defendant was predicated
on the long-arm statute.

The trial court granted a motion to

quash, holding the contacts between the manufacturer and the Utah
purchaser insufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded to trial.

This

Court conceded at the outset that the defendant was not "doing
business" within the State of Utah, and noted that there was no
evidence that the defendant had ever sold any other product to
any other Utah resident.

However, this Court then observed that

the long-arm statute is meant to govern those situations in which
the non-resident defendant is not doing business within Utah, and
that it "pertains to jurisdiction over persons concerning claims
against them arising from certain 'minimum contacts' between
those persons and this State."

608 P.2d at 246.

That statute,

then, was held to reach the facts of the Burt case, so long as
the exercise of jurisdiction would be constitutional.
In that regard, the opinion articulated the following standard:
Due process requires that defendant's contacts
with this State be purposeful on the part of the
defendant so that it can be said that the defendant reasonably knew that he submitted himself to
this jurisdiction to answer for any harm caused by
him . . . .
Id.

(emphasis added).

In applying that standard to the Burt

facts, the Court said:
-11-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Here, the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint show that their claims arise out of defendant's contacts with this State, which
were: (1) defendant purposefully contracted
with a resident of this State, knowing that it
was a resident, and (2) defendant purposefully
undertook to supply goods to that resident
reasonably knowing or anticipating that those
goods would be used in this State . . . .
Further, the allegations of the complaint are
that part of the injury caused by the defective goods was sustained here. Defendant,
therefore has had sufficient contacts with
this State to meet the provisions of (the
long-arm statute].
Id. at 247 (emphasis added).
Thus, the Court said, it was proper for Utah to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant, even though the Utah plaintiff initiated the contact, even though the machinery was delivered to
Colorado and used in New Mexico, and even though only a part of
the injury occurred in Utah.

Under the Burt tests, knowingly sup-

plying equipment to a Utahn for use in Utah would sustain jurisdiction.

In the present case, defendant must concede that those

tests are satisfied.
In his concurrence, Justice Stewart distinguished Burt from
previous cases involving items that would normally be used in the
locality where they were purchased.*

He noted that while it

* Specifically, Justice Stewart discussed Pelligrini v. Sachs
& Sons, 522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974), in which a Utah immigrant
sought to sue a California automobile dealer for injuries sustained in Utah as a result of alleged mechanical defects. She
purchased the car while still a California domiciliary. The
defendant in that case had no control over where the purchaser
might take the car, and Justice Stewart noted that the dealer was
not engaged in an interstate business - he sold cars only in
California. In Burt and in the present case, however, the defendants actively solicited interstate business, and knew that the
particular products involved were to be used in Utah.

-12-
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would be unfair to subject the vendor to the jurisdiction of a
forum to which "the vendor had no reasonable expectation that his
products might be transported," he concluded that a manufacturer
of industrial goods stands in a different position.

He said:

Large nationwide or multistate businesses,
which make great efforts to sell their products to as broad a population as possible,
purposefully make use of the free channels of
commerce and should be held accountable for
legal actions arising out of their use of the
nation's channels of commerce.
608 P.2d at 256.
The facts here argue more compellingly than did those of Burt
for the exercise of jurisdiction.

There, the equipment, though

bulky, was portable; the mere fact of foreseeable use in Utah was an
adequate factual basis for jurisdiction. Here, the large machine
involved was installed on the plaintiff's premises by the defendant.
Use in Utah was far more than foreseeable; there was no other possible place in which the machine could be used.
In the second relevant case, Mallory Engineering, Inc. v.
Brown, No. 15530 and 15544 (Utah, March 6, 1980), this Court sustained a trial court's denial of a motion to quash service made
by a non-resident defendant.

Again, the case involved the fur-

nishing of an allegedly defective product for use in Utah.

This

Court adverted to the evolutionary aspect of Utah decisions, and
it reiterated the Burt criteria for applicability of the long-arm
statute: the purposeful act of manufacture and sale of an item
where its use in Utah is foreseeable.

Id., slip op. at 3.

This

was true despite the fact that the defendant had no office,

-13-
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property or agents in Utah, nor did it advertise within the
State.

Under the Burt test, these once-dispositive factors

became irrelevant.

Id.

The Mallory opinion then considered whether subjecting the
defendant to Utah's jurisdiction comported with due process, and
concluded that the question involved balancing the inconvenience
to the defendant against the interests of the state in assuming
jurisdiction.

The Court's observation is worth quoting at some

length:
This Court recognizes that any litigation undertaken in a foreign jurisdiction
results in some inconvenience to the nonresident defendant. The fact that [the
defendant] had no general offices or operations in the State and scheduled no representation in the State, substantiate its
assertions of inconvenience. However, the
inconvenience to the nonresident must be
viewed in relation to the importance of the
conflict litigated, which, in a commercial
setting, is evidenced by the amount in controversy. If the amount is trivial in
comparison to the expense of litigating in
the foreign forum and the possibility of the
defendant defaulting reaches sufficient
proportions, the demands of fair play and
substantial justice dictate the reservation
of the state's jurisdictional power.·

In undertaking interestate (sic) business,
[the defendant] must recognize and accomodate
within its operations the probability and
necessity of litigating in foreign forums.
. . . . Balanced against the above considerations is the express interest the State of
Utah has in ensuring protection to its residents from the unlawful acts of non-residents.

-14-
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Balancing the importance of this interest in relation to commercial transactions
involving the supply of goods into the state
by a non-resident manufacturer, and the
relatively minor degree of inconvenience
required to defend this action in Utah, we
hold the district court's extension of jurisdiction over [the defendant] to be reasonable. Therefore, the district court's jurisdiction .
did not abridge the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .
Id., slip op. at 4.
The due process test of Mallory, then, is satisfied in this
case.

The amount in controversy is over $90,000--the cost of the

machine.

Surely, that will dissuade defendant from defaulting.

Although the defendant in this case may not have directed its
trade journal advertising specifically at Utah readers, the mere
fact that it advertises nationally indicates an intention to make
sales to customers in distant forums.

Such an intent, as this

Court has recognized, gives rise to a correllative obligation to
litigate in those forums--that is an integral cost of doing
business.
In the present case, a balancing of the interests involved
strongly supports Utah's exercise of jurisdiction.
is located in Utah.

The machine

Trial testimony will center around its con-

dition, so it will no doubt have to be inspected by witnesses,
and perhaps even by the trier of fact.

The issue will be the

condition of this particular machine, not the general integrity
of defendant's manufacturing process.

All this suggests that a

Utah forum will be far more convenient for the witnesses.

Nor do

any facts suggest that a Utah forum would be any less convenient
to defendant than a Michigan forum would be to plaintiff, and
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equal inconvenience ought not be enough to disturb a plaintiff's
forum choice.

Finally, Utah has a substantial interest in pro-

viding a forum in which its residents may seek redress from a
non-resident manufacturer who knows that if his product malfunctions, the resultant injury will be suffered in Utah.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This case involves the propriety of exercising jurisdiction
over a non-resident manufacturer of a large, custom-made machine
that the defendant manufacturer installed in plaintiff's Utah
plant.

The machine has never operated properly, and plaintiffs

sought redress in Utah District Court.

The trial court granted

defendant's motion to quash service of process for lack of jurisdiction.

This appeal is from that judgment.

The case is squarely within the purview of Utah's long-arm
statute because defendants both contracted to supply services in
Utah -- namely, installation

and because plaintiffs sustained

injuries in Utah arising out of defendant's breach of both express and implied warranties.

Because defendant's act of selling

and installing this large and expensive machine to plaintiff was
clearly purposeful, it is apparent that defendant sought to avail
itself of the benefits of undertaking commercial activity within
this state.

Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction was proper under

the Producers Livestock standard, which prevailed at the time of
the trial court's ruling.
Moreover, subsequent decisions by this Court, which control
this appeal, unmistakably require the exercise of jurisdiction.

-16Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Burt Drilling, a factually similar case involving a large but
portable machine, sustained jurisdiction predicated on foreseeability of the product's use in Utah.
portable.

Here, the machine is not

It could only be used in Utah, and thus it was inevit-

able that any injury arising out of its malfunctioning would be
sustained in Utah.

The due process test of Mallory Engineering

is satisfied because the amount in controversy, some $90,000, is
substantial enough to insure that defendant will not default.
The interests of the plaintiff and the forum state argue for
jurisdiction in Utah, as does the presence of the machine, which
is the subject of this litigation and which will almost certainly
have to be inspected by witnesses, if not by the trier of fact.
Defendants may be somewhat inconvenienced by the Utah forum, but
as this Court noted in Mallory Engineering, that is the inevitable consequence of electing to engage in interstate commerce,
and is certainly insufficient, by itself, to disturb plaintiff's
forum choice.
For the foregoing reasons, jurisdiction over defendant must
be exercised.

The motion to quash granted below should be

reversed, and the case remanded for trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of June, 1980.

K&~~
of & for
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79 South State Street
Post Office Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
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